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Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and
Promise of Critical Legal Theory for
Peoples of Color
Robert A. Williams, Jr.*
Whoever wants to learn a science has to learn to master its
methodology.
Hans-Georg Gadamer'
Introduction
I want to relate a parable. This parable will serve as a preamble to my basic theme, which is the perils and promise of critical
legal theory for peoples of color. This theme will be elaborated by
specifically focusing upon the Critical Legal Studies movement in
the United States, and the relevance or irrelevance, the benefits or
dangers, this movement holds for minority legal scholars and
theorists.
I tell this parable in an indigenous American context,
although I have read or heard the parable's basic scenario frequently applied to other so-called "primitive" peoples of the
Fourth World. In that sense, the parable may be regarded as part
of the apocrypha of European-derived colonizing discourse.
My own intention, however, in placing the parable as the inaugural of a specifically intended non-Europeanized legal discursive practice is to illustrate the suppressed, self-deciphering
potential of all European-derived apocryphal texts, fables, and
myths respecting peoples of color. The etymology of the word
apochrypha itself suggests the methodology of just such a practice:
apocrypha-from the Greek apokryphos, meaning hidden or obscure; derived from apo ("away"), and kryptein ("to hide," which
is also the root source of our word "crypt"). Thus, apocrypha indicates a hiding away or burying, from which springs our contemporary usage of the word to indicate writings or statements of
spurious authenticity. (The etymological imbrications become
even more intense when one considers that our word "spurious"
* Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law. A.B. 1977, Loyola
College; J.D. 1980, Harvard University. Member, Lumbee Indian Tribe.
1. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics 11 (1976).
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derives from the Latin, spurius, for bastard. It was Friedrich
Nietzsche who realized, of course, that philosophy must serve as
the root legitimating basis for any critical theory that would avoid
2
the charge of spuriousness.)
The deciphering of European-derived colonizing discourse requires a methodology capable of unearthing the techniques and
multiple forms of subjugation concealed by the dominant culture's
apocrypha respecting peoples of color. This unearthing is the penultimate goal of a non-Europeanized, minority scholarly practice.
The ultimate goal of such a scholarship is to rediscover through
this disinterring act our own discrete insurrectionist discourses
suppressed by the tyranny of totalizing visions of knowledge and
power. 3 Whether critical legal theory can be of assistance to our
projects represents a central inquiry pursued in this article. A related but less central inquiry pursued in this article is whether the
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, which has consistently
generated texts displaying contempt, hostility, and suspicion of
"rights" discourse-the most effective of the insurrectionist discourses utilized in the struggles of peoples of color-offers either
spurious or authentic assistance to a minority scholarly practice.
The Parable of the Grandfather and the Elevator
An old Indian Grandfather, who was also a traditional
medicine man of his tribe in the southwestern part of the United
States, left Indian Country for the first time to visit his tribe's lawyers in Phoenix. The lawyers were handling a land claim for the
tribe. Like many Indian Nations, the Grandfather's tribe was
deeply split and factionalized along the usual assimilationist-traditionalist lines. 4 The assimilateds-those who had been educated in
the schools provided by the colonial government and who viewed
progress in material, Anglo-derived terms--controlled the tribal
government. The assimilateds were unanimously in favor of pursuing monetary damages for this huge tribal land claim dating
back many years. They had been convinced by the lawyers, all
non-Indians, that Congress was not likely to authorize the return
of the lands which were now prosperous ranches owned by
2. See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Geneology of Morals §§ 162-63 (F. Golffing
trans. 1956).
3. See generally Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77, at 78-108 (Colin Gordon ed. 1980)
(discussing the powers associated with the institutional functioning of scientific discourse in our society)..
4. See Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford M. Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past
and Future of American Indian Sovereignty 215-64 (1984).
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wealthy white cattle ranchers. The assimilateds believed that the
tribe should therefore pursue monetary compensation in the white
man's courts. The lawyers told the tribe there was only a small
chance of winning the litigation and, if they lost, the tribe would
probably be precluded from pursuing any claims in other forums.
Despite the risks, however, the lawyers were willing to litigate the
tribal claim for the normal ten percent of any monetary award dictated by the usual federal statutes. 5 The potential payoff for a victorious claim, in the tens of millions of dollars, made the risk
worth a law firm's while.
The traditionalists, the grandmothers and grandfathers
whose own world view led them to regard Anglicized political and
legal processes as un-Indian, and therefore to be avoided, and who
exercised a dangerously regarded influence on the youths of the
tribe, had not participated in the tribal government's decision to
hire the lawyers and pursue the money claim. When word of the
decision reached them, however (which took a while as most lived
far from the main town on the reservation, which they called "Red
Tape Junction"), they were very upset. They decided to make a
special trip to the next tribal council meeting, and they named the
old Grandfather-medicine man as their spokesman.
The presence of so many traditionals, most of whom were elders and therefore very respected by all the people (even the tribal
government officeholders), alarmed the assimilateds in the tribal
5. See generally Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford M. Lytle, American Indians,
American Justice 142-43 (1983). For example, under legislation establishing the Indian Claims Commission, attorneys representing tribes with claims against the
United States were entitled to up to 10% of the amount recovered in any case.
These claims frequently brought awards to the tribes in the millions of dollars. See
id.
REPRESENTATION BY ATTORNEYS
Sec. 15. Each such tribe, band, or other identifiable group of Indians may retain to represent its interests in the presentation of claims
before the Commission an attorney or attorneys at law, of its own selection, whose practice before the Commission shall be regulated by its
adopted procedure. The fees of such attorney or attorneys for all services rendered in prosecuting the claim in question, whether before the
Commission or otherwise, shall, unless the amount of such fees is stipulated in the approved contract between the attorney or attorneys and
the claimant, be fixed by the Commission at such amount as the Commission, in accordance with standards obtaining for prosecuting similar
contingent claims in courts of law, finds to be adequate compensation
for services rendered and results obtained, considering the contingent
nature of the case, plus all reasonable expenses incurred in the prosecution of the claim; but the amount so fixed by the Commission, exclusive of reimbursements for actual expenses, shall not exceed 10 per
centum of the amount recovered in any case.
Act of Aug. 13, 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049, 1053 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 70n (1976))
(repealed Sept. 30, 1978).
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council. The traditional elders had never taken much of an interest in politics; in fact, most had never even voted in tribal elections, much less white men's elections. Everyone knew that
something big was going to happen. They let the Grandfather
speak, and he addressed the concerns of his group. "If the land
was taken as you and your lawyers say, then why not get it back?
The land is sacred. Money cannot buy land. Money is what the
white man uses to buy the Indian; money is what gets the Indian
to give up the only thing of value that the white man ever wants in
6
return from us, our land."
All the other traditional elders, as well as many of the
younger members of the tribe, nodded their heads in agreement.
The Council chairman, who was basically a good man but a far better politician, did not desire to cause a greater division in the tribe
6. The use of the term "white man" by the Grandfather may require some explanation. At least with respect to this one instance, consciousness raising might
excuse the masculine bias infecting the Grandfather's discourse. Peoples of color in
the United States frequently refer to the "white man" or simply "the man" in generic discussions on the oppressive reality of racial hierarchy in this country. Thus,
the male gender references used by the Grandfather throughout the parable represent my own reductionist concerns for capturing the discursive experience of peoples of color. I have never personally heard an Indian person refer to the "white
woman" as a generic term for conveying the reality of racial polarization in the
United States. From an Indian perspective, in fact, this masculine bias in referring
to whites is entirely consistent with our own call to consciousness whenever we discuss the history of white colonization of America. When one examines that history,
one inevitably finds that it is a history of the thought, actions, and discourse of European men. There are exceptions, such as Isabella's sanctions of Columbus upon
learning of his enslavement of Indians on the island of Hispaniola. See Robert Williams, The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the American Indian
in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 37 (1983). The small number of
exceptions, however, serves to emphasize that the conquest of Indians and the development of legal rules to regulate their colonization has been primarily an enterprise of European-descended males. Carol Gilligan's book, In A Different Voice
(1982), offers provocative insights into male psychology that may at least partially
explain this historical phenomenon. Gilligan identifies a mystical respect for the
rules of the game, combined with a socialization process stressing competitive and
aggressive behavior, as key components in the male's early psychological development in European-derived cultures. On the other hand, the early psychological development of women is characterized by "an ethic of care [which] rests on the
premise of non-violence" in these societies. Id. at 174. There are numerous other
points of illumination in contemporary feminist scholarship which link its project
with that of an Americanized scholarship of European colonization of the Indian.
There is, in fact, a tremendous potential that these two different voices can generate a multifaceted critical discourse on the dominant European-male derived vision
in contemporary theoretical fields. Finally, it is important to note that Indian people can boast of a proud and varied history of women assuming important leadership and peacemaking roles in the tribe. See generally Carolyn Forman, Indian
Women Chiefs (1954) (describing numerous tribes in which women asserted substantial leadership roles). A recent and excellent comprehensive bibliography on
American Indian women is provided in Gretchen Bataille & Kathleen Sands,
American Indian Women: Telling Their Lives 155-206 (1984).
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than already existed. He particularly did not wish to see a normally quiescent faction of the tribe mobilized. He first attempted
to describe the "realities" of the situation, but quickly became
frustrated in attempting to explain in simple terms the complexities of the white man's laws and politics.
"Look," he said, "why don't we send you as representative of
your own people down to Phoenix to talk with the lawyers, and
they can explain it to you. Then you can ask them these same
questions which I am not able to answer. If you are not then satisfied, you can come back here and let us know. Then we will talk
further and perhaps pursue a different path." At that point someone in the audience shouted, "Yes, like hiring different lawyers."
At that, everyone laughed. After the laughter died down, the old
medicine man looked around him and saw that his people all
seemed to think that the chairman's suggestion was a good idea
and made in good faith. "Besides," one of them whispered behind
him, "you've never seen Phoenix before."
The Grandfather nodded. While he'd never been to Phoenix
before, had never even left the borders of his Nation, he had
talked to lawyers, years ago. He was quite familiar with their
ways, particularly with how they used and twisted words as a pretense of their "open minds." He'd come to the conclusion long ago
that the only thing lawyers really kept open was their hands to
grab more money from Indian people, and that once they'd made
up their mind, nothing could really be done about it. But his people seemed to think it was a good idea to go to the white man's big
city, to walk through the "canyons of steel" as he'd heard it once
described. He would go to Phoenix to hear what these lawyers had
to say, to see if it was possible to get the land back, instead of just
trading in the land for something ultimately worthless to his people, like money. If he was not satisfied with their double-talk, he
would return and suggest that the tribe hire other lawyers who
would act in the tribe's best interest rather than in their own.
The Grandfather was put on the bus to Phoenix. At the bus
station, he was met by two young associates from the law firm who
were to escort him down to the firm's prestigious offices. The
Grandfather was amused that the law firm was so afraid of an old
Indian medicine man that it had sent a beefed-up regiment; two
one-hundred-dollar-an-hour white men to make sure nothing went
wrong.
As they entered the lobby of the firm's office building, the
young associates started shuffling to the elevator, but suddenly the
medicine man froze in his tracks. "I hope," he said urgently, "that
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you do not intend for me to walk through those doors." One of the
associates winked at the other, and answered reassuringly, "Why
of course. It's only an elevator." The Grandfather then said, "I do
not know what you call it. I only know that a minute ago those
doors opened and a man walked in. Then these doors closed, and
next thing I know, the doors opened again, and a woman walked
out. That's bad medicine where I come from." After a few moments of explanation, the associates thought they had the situation
under control, and the Grandfather agreed to use the elevator.
When they reached the offices, all the other lawyers laughed along
with the Grandfather when the story was told.
Selected Readings
In discussing the perils and promise of critical legal theory
for peoples of color, it is important to keep the parable of the
Grandfather and the Elevator in mind. As part of the apocrypha
of European colonizing discourse, the parable would seem to indicate a reading embedded in a familiar homological structure. The
"primitive" encounters the "modern." In his simplicity and assumed backwardness, the primitive mistakenly translates a highly
familiar, pedestrian occurrence in the modern world as something
magical: a metamorphosis. The competing visions contained by the
parable-primitive-modern, magic-technics-illuminate essential
differences in world view between the two cultures. With respect
to those differences, we are led inevitably to certain acts of
privileging one world view over the other. What seems magical to
the primitive can be readily explained by the modern man's science. The old man, though respected as wise in his own world, is
disoriented, lost like a child in the "real" world of the white man.
Even the young associates "know" more than him. Though novel,
the primitive's world view is demonstrated as being patently
wrong, an anachronism, something that should be abandoned once
the last of the Grandfather's generation has passed away. While
the lawyers laugh with the Grandfather, they also laugh at him.
One might be disposed to dig deeper into the parable's
"meaning," to gloss over the old man's seeming ignorance of the
rudimentary knowledge of "civilized" life. One might rage at a
world, a society, which could so poorly equip this noble old man to
fight his upcoming battle of wits with the lawyers.
We are left with two alternative readings of the parable, two
interpretations of its meaning for us. Our first reading judges the
Grandfather's primitive world view by the demysticized reality of
our "modern" vision of the world. The comedy of the parable lies
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precisely in the Grandfather's failure to assimilate the data of the
modern's reality to his own primitive vision. The "meaning" of the
parable contained in this first reading is this failure of the primitive to assimilate to modernity.
Our second reading of the parable judges modernity itself by
the Grandfather's failure. It views the Grandfather's inability to
assimilate the idea of the modern's vision to his own primitive reality as tragedy. The "meaning" of the parable contained in this
second reading is the indictment of modernity for its failure to facilitate the primitive's adaptation to relentless necessity.
The difference between these two Eurocentred readings is
not as great as one might suppose. It is the difference between
either a discourse of superiority and a discourse of paternalism
(which is only that of superiority with good intentions). To illustrate, it is the difference between apocrypha like The Gods Must
Be Crazy, a movie which the South African ambassador to Canada
cites in support of apartheid,7 and apocrypha like The Emerald
Forest, a movie which incites white liberals to manufacture their
sympathy for vanishing indigenous peoples and their novel vision
of life.8 Both movies are parasites upon the corpus of texts, myths,
and fables of European-derived colonizing discourse respecting
peoples of color.
Both these Eurocentrically-related readings of the parable
imply that defeat waits for the Grandfather at the end of his elevator ride. The medicine man will himself be mystified by the lawyers, who will then demystify their legal science for the primitive's
enlightenment and win him over to their view of things. These
two readings will be utilized to signify the perils of critical legal
theory for peoples of color. Within the context of these related
readings of the parable, the medicine man will lose faith in his vi7. Interview on "Sunday Morning" (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Oct.
6, 1985). The Gods Must Be Crazy (Twentieth Century Fox 1984) recounts the trials
and tribulations of an African bushman who takes on the task of ridding his tribe
of a chanced-upon soda bottle. The bottle's utility and uniqueness had made it an
object of desire amongst the tribespeople, and thus had introduced unassimilable
concepts of private property within the community. The bushman goes upon a

journey to throw the troubling object off the edge of the world, and during the
course of his journey, meets various white Africans. The remainder of the comedy
explores the unbridgeable contrasts between the bushman's world view and that of
"civilized" white Africans.
8. In The Emerald Forest (Embassy 1985), the son of a white engineer engaged
in taming the Amazon wilderness is kidnapped by Indians. The white boy "becomes" an Indian, a fact which the father finds difficult to accept after finally
tracking his son down after many years. The movie's principal theme is the radical
difference between the Indian world view, tragically caricatured as magical yet
anachronistic and doomed to disappear, and the civilized white world view, caricatured as inevitably triumphant yet deficient.
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sion of the world; he may even feel like a fool now that the white
man's science has been explained to him. He may abandon his
faith in his own magic for another's magic. He will use the elevator, but know he is many steps behind his white brother.
It is possible to unearth a divergent interpretation of the parable in which the homology of its structure dissipates in a more
radical confrontation with its text. The first two readings indicate
the power of European-derived colonial and cultural-imperialist
discursive practice. 9 Note that both readings relied upon a shift in
focus at the critical moment of the parable's denouement. Until
the moment when the Grandfather stopped at the elevator, we understood the parable's world as the Grandfather's world; we assumed we spoke his language. Yet at the moment of the
Grandfather's faux pas, did you not, as reader, immediately focus
beyond what the Grandfather saw, confident in your own knowledge of the "truth" of the elevator, assuming the same position of
superiority as the two young associates? In a sense, did you not
abandon the old man once his world view proved divergent and, in
light of your own interpretation-spurious. Did you not laugh
also? Such is the power of the European's episteme that its denial
9. See, e.g., the discussion in Foucault, supra note 3, at 85-86:
By comparison, then, and in contrast to the various projects which
aim to inscribe knowledges in the hierarchical order of power associated with science, a genealogy should be seen as a kind of attempt to
emancipate historical knowledges from subjection, to render them,
that is, capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of a
theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse. It is based on a reactivation of local knowledges-of minor knowledges ... in opposition
to the scientific hierarchisation of knowledges and the effects intrinsic
to their power: this, then, is the project of these disordered and fragmentary genealogies....
Is the relation of forces today still such as to allow these disinterred knowledges some kind of autonomous life? Can they be isolated by these means from every subjugating relationship? What force
do they have taken in themselves? And, after all, is it not perhaps the
case that these fragments of genealogies are no sooner brought to
light, that the particular elements of the knowledge that one seeks to
disinter are no sooner accredited and put into circulation, than they
run the risk of re-codification, recolonization? In fact, those unitary
discourses, which first disqualified and then ignored them when they
made their appearance, are, it seems, quite ready now to annex them,
to take them back within the fold of their own discourse and to invest
them with everything this implies in terms of their effects of knowledge and power. And if we want to protect these only lately liberated
fragments are we not in danger of ourselves constructing, with our
own hands, that unitary discourse to which we are invited, perhaps to
lure us into a trap, by those who say to us: 'All this is fine, but where
are you heading? What kind of unity are you after?' The temptation,
up to a certain point, is to reply: 'Well, we just go on, in a cumulative
fashion; after all, the moment at which we risk colonisation has not
yet arrived'. One could even attempt to throw out a challenge: 'Just
try to colonize us then!'
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of heterodoxy dictates a discursive practice of abandonment and
marginalization; spatial strategies which, like our discourses upon
death ("He has passed away," "She has gone on ahead of us," etc.),
obscure and deny the inexorableness of our own temporality.
Would you feel as confident in your interpretation, however,
if you knew that "playing Indian" was a traditional strategy employed by indigenous Americans in dealing with non-Indians, particularly in situations of unequal bargaining power. In Indian
discourse, "playing Indian" (also referred to as the "noble savage
game"), means to play upon the white man's own prejudices and
sense of superiority in order to assure that he underestimates your
abilities. The strategy has been acquired and perfected over years
of learning to deal with a stronger adversary possessing no compunctions about the morality of dissembling or refusing to deal "in
perfect good faith."'10 The most renowned victim of this strategy
died with his boots on in a nineteenth century South Dakota military skirmish intended to enforce the United States's abrogation of
an Indian treaty."From this non-Eurocentred angle of vision, a highly tenable
reading previously buried within this apocryphal parable is revealed. The Grandfather is respected and trusted among his people. Although the Grandfather has never left Indian Country, he
likely knows enough about the world and the white man's technological capacity to neither overestimate nor underestimate its
achievements. He had heard about the "canyons of steel" in the
white man's city. Is it that unlikely that he's had an elevator described to him in answer to the quite reasonable question as to
how one reached the top of such tall buildings creating these canyons? For that matter, there may even be an elevator on the reservation itself, perhaps in the Indian Health Clinic or tribal
government office building. Perhaps, you too, dear reader, so unfamiliar with the ways by which Indian people live and survive in
a society such as ours, underestimated the Grandfather.
From this non-Eurocentered perspective, the parable tells the
tale of an old man seeking to gain any advantage possible in the
game of wits where he recognizes his own weaker position. The
12
lawyers, after all, want a chance at their ten percent legal fee.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
11. See id. at 367-80 (describing General George Armstrong Custer's role in the
events leading to the breach of the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty with the Sioux Nation. Custer died at the Battle of the Little Big Horn, June 25, 1876, in the midst of
a campaign to round up "hostile" Sioux exercising their hunting rights under the
Fort Laramie Treaty).
12. See Deloria & Lytle, supra note 5, at 142-43.
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The old man's diversionary tactic at the elevator presents a potential obstacle, though not a serious one in the lawyers' minds, as
they do not recognize it as a diversion to their winning this game.
If they can convince the Grandfather of the "impossibility" of getting the land back, then they can pursue their strategy unhindered. In this game of playing Indian, the Grandfather seeks to
play upon his opponents' own prejudices, to let them think "they
had the situation under control." He is, in effect, engaged in discursive guerrilla warfare, a deadly game of dissimulation, in which
only the Grandfather knows that both sides are dissembling. He
thus seeks to gain an advantage when the lawyers fail to choose
their words as carefully as they might for a more "worthy" adversary. He will strike at that moment when their own sense of superiority leads them to carelessly lower their guard left undefended
by their double-talk, inflict whatever damage he can, seek concessions, and, if lucky, win their withdrawal. His ultimate goal is
3
decolonization.1
We have seen such guerrilla tactics deployed successfully
against the white man before: Vietnam; the Marine barracks in
Lebanon; even the Little Big Horn. All these historical events are
the negative by-products of a discourse of knowledge and power
seeking to sustain itself by its own cultural hubris. Terrorism becomes a necessity only when a dominant discourse seeks to
marginalize or extinguish those radically divergent discursive practices it has colonized. Terrorism becomes a possibility, however,
only when a dominant discourse then underestimates the vestigial
knowledge and power of those oppositional practices not yet fully
suppressed.
Our divergent interpretation of the parable of the Grandfather and the Elevator will be utilized to signify the promise of critical legal theory for peoples of color. Within the context of this
reading of the parable, the medicine man slyly deploys a strategy
which seeks to turn the white man's own discourse against him, in
order to reveal what lies buried beneath his adversary's discursive
practices. The Grandfather relies on his faith in his own "magic,"
the historical knowledge of the struggles of his people, and the
hard-learned lessons it teaches. He fights to preserve the integrity
of his own world view against the tyranny of illegitimate globalizing discourses.14 He patiently improves his trusted weapons, traps,
13. See generally Edward Said, The Text, The World, The Critic, in Textual
Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism 161-88 (Josue Harari ed.
1979) (illustrates deconstructionist theories as applied to literary criticism).
14. See Foucault, supra note 3, at 80-81.
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and snares which he continually deploys to overcome the white
man's temporary advantage in discursive guerrilla warfare. He
will use the elevator, but will not let on that he is one step ahead
of his white brother. He will strive to laugh last.
Of Parabology
The parable has in one sense introduced the basic theme of
my text, but in another, more profound sense, has concluded it as
well. In its paricidal acts of anticipation and reconstitution,' 5 the
parable cannot stand as other than the perils and promise of critical legal theory for peoples of color, though we may expect less of
it. In this sense, what follows the preamble is a digression, "a reexamination of the familiar."1 6 Admitting that this is my intent
only problematizes the normal assumption of the text as provisional origin of the preamble, an assumption based on certain
problematic Western conceptions of space and time. But one must
leave sight of familiar shores in order to discover new worlds, and
even then one may not possess the lexicon to define what has been
found. What else could that lost Genoan sailor name the inhabitants of America, other than "Indians." To think what lies buried
beneath the apocryphal story of the "discovery" of America. The
European credited with "discovering" America was so utterly lost
that after three separate voyages, he died still believing he had
17
found a new route to Japan.
15. The preface, by daring to repeat the book and reconstitute it in another register, merely enacts what is already the case: the book's repetitions are always other than the book. There is, in fact, no "book"
other than these ever-different repetitions: the "book" in other words,
is always already a "text," constituted by the play of identity and difference. A written preface provisionally localizes the place where, between reading and reading, book and book, the inter-inscribing of
"reader(s)," "writer(s)," and language is forever at work.
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Translator'sPreface, in Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology at xii (1976).
16. Id. at xiii.
17. Robert Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian
from Columbus to the Present 4-6 (1978) (discussing Columbus's mistaken belief
that he had discovered islands among the East Indies and thereby denominated the
Arawak tribespeople he "discovered" in the Bahamas "los Indios." The Arawaks
were given their revenge, however, by sixteenth century European geographers,

who honored the Genoan's "discovery" by the name of another). As for Columbus's
geographical state of mind respecting exactly what he discovered, most geographical and naval historians who have studied the issue closely have concluded that Co-

lumbus died firmly holding "the conviction that he had reached Asia." George E.
Nunn, The Geographical Conceptions of Columbus: A Critical Consideration of

Four Problems 55-56 (1924).
An earlier group of historians, perhaps inspired in 1892 by the 400th anniversary of Columbus's first voyage, sought to revise the commonly held thesis that Columbus died unaware that he "had discovered a new world distinct from the India
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What Is Critical Legal Theory?18
What is critical legal theory, and how might it assist a project
and Cathay which had been the original object of his search." Id. at 56. See, e.g.,
Henry Harrisse, The Discovery of North America: A Critical, Documentary, and
Historic Investigation (1892); J.B. Thacker, Christopher Columbus: His Life, His
Work, His Remains, As Revealed by Original Printed and Manuscript Records 568,
612 (1904). Nunn's book, supra, adequately refutes these efforts at Columbus-revisionism. Samuel Eliot Morison, the leading contemporary United States scholar on
Columbus, wrote:
[I]t is one of the ironies of history that the Admiral himself died ignorant of what he had really accomplished, still insisting that he had discovered a large number of islands, a province of China, and an "Other
World"; but of the vast extent of that "Other World," and of the ocean
that lay between it and Asia, he had neither knowledge or suspicion.
Samuel Eliot Morison, The European Discovery of America: The Southern Voyages
266 (1974).
As we approach the 500th anniversary of Columbus's "discovery," those
tempted toward revisionism ought to recognize that the great Admiral was the first,
and one of the greatest, enslavers of the indigenous peoples he named "Indians" in
the history of the New World. Williams, supra note 6, at 37.
18. Professor Duncan Kennedy has defined critical legal studies as "the
emergence of a new left intelligensia committed at once to theory and to practice,
and creating a radical left world view in an area where once there were only
variations on the theme of legitimation of the status quo." Duncan Kennedy,
Critical Labour Theory: A Comment, 4 Indus. Rel. L.J. 503, 506 (1981). Professor
Alan Hunt, in one of the most thoughtful and penetrating critiques of the Critical
Legal Studies movement, has described it as "the first movement in legal theory
and legal scholarship in the United States to have espoused a committed left
political stance and perspective." Alan Hunt, The Theory of CriticalLegal Studies,
6 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1 (1986). Roberto Unger, in by far the most widely-cited
manifesto of the Critical Legal Studies movement, has stated: "The critical legal
studies movement has undermined the central ideas of modern legal thought and
put another conception of law in their place. This conception implies a view of
society and informs a practice of politics." Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical
Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 563, 563 (1983). Unger goes on in a
footnote to describe the two schools of critical legal scholarship as follows:
Two main tendencies can be distinguished in the critical legal
studies movement. One tendency sees past or contemporary doctrine
as the expression of a particular vision of society while emphasizing
the contradictory and manipulable character of doctrinal argument.
Its immediate antecedents lie in anti-formalist legal theories and
structuralist approaches to cultural history. . . . Another tendency
grows out of the social theories of Marx and Weber and the mode of
social and historical analysis that combines functionalist methods with
radical aims. Its point of departure has been the thesis that law and
legal doctrine reflect, confirm, and reshape the social divisions and
hierarchies inherent in a type or stage of social organization such as
"capitalism." But this thesis has been increasingly modified by the
awareness that institutional types or stages lack the cohesive and
foreordained character that received leftist theory attributes to
them ....
Both tendencies criticize the dominant style of legal theories that
try to refine and preserve this style. Both repudiate in the course of
this critique the attempt to impute current social arrangements to the
requirements of industrial society, human nature, or moral order.
Both have yet to take a clear position on the method, the content, and
even the possibility of prescriptive and programmatic thought, perhaps
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seeking to decode the apocryphal texts, fables, and myths of European-derived colonial and cultural-imperialist discourse respecting
peoples of color?
Critical legal theory can trace its influence to two separate intellectual movements of the early and middle decades of this century; critical social theory, a peculiarly European phenomenon,
and Legal Realism, a phenomenon peculiar to the United States.
Primary figures of critical social theory include Theodor Adorno,
Louis Althusser, Antonio Gramsci, Max Horkheimer, Georg
Lukacs, and Herbert Marcuse. One could widen the circle of influence by including such diverse theorists as Claude Levi-Strauss,
Jean Piaget, and Max Weber, and also by acknowledging the contributions of a later generation pruning essentially the same vineyard: Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Hans-Georg Gadamer,
Jurgen Habermas, Jacques Lacan, E.P. Thompson, and Raymond
Williams. While I've ignored certain, overly technical, generic distinctions, and certainly omitted at least one of several "major"
figures from someone's list of favorite, mostly dead, famous
Europeans,19 a certain distinguishing feature marks the work of
the entire group. It would be impossible to imagine a corpus of
work broadly defined as critical social theory without the substantive foundations provided by Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche,
and in a less direct way, Sigmund Freud.
The second major intellectual current that has shaped critical
legal theory is American Legal Realism, a movement which flourished in several eastern law schools in the 1920s and 1930s.20 A list
because some of the assumptions inherited from the radical tradition
make it hard to turn constructive proposals into more than statements
of commitment or anticipations of history.
The significance of the contrast between these tendencies should
not be overstated. The actual works often differ less than the abstract
interpretations placed upon them. And, many writings do not fall into
either of the two groups mentioned.
Id. at 563-64 n.1.
19. Rendering any such list is frought with danger. I've listed individuals with
the purpose in mind of giving an indication of the broad spectrum of materialist
and sociological thought informing "critical social theory." Perry Anderson's
works, particularly Considerations on Western Marxism (1976) and In the Tracks
of Historical Materialism (1983), provide good introductions to the dominant
figures, styles, and works of the European critical school. Specific discussions on
the impact of European critical and social theory on the Critical Legal Studies
movement can be found in Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal
Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 199, 213-30 (1984); David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is:
Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 575 (1984); Hunt, supra
note 18, at 2-3.
20. See, e.g., Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 19, at 204; Hunt, supra note
18, at 4-5.
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of its major figures would include Karl Llewellyn, Felix Cohen,
and Jerome Frank. 21 What distinguishes the work of this group is
its "essentially negative and iconoclastic"2 2 stance toward the legal
process. For the most part, Legal Realism simply abandoned the
effort to construct a theory of judicial decision making. Instead, its
leading figures invested their energies and hopes in the New Deal
and its "expert" administrative agencies to achieve the ideals of
liberalism. 23 It was a tentative form of nihilism in response to
modernism's corrosive impact upon all forms of twentieth century
Western thought.
The inheritance of these two divergent intellectual currents
in United States legal scholarship is critical legal theory, as elaborated today by the Critical Legal Studies movement (CLS), the
principal heir.24 A short list of its major figures would include
Morton Horowitz, Duncan Kennedy, Tom Heller, David Trubek,
Mark Tushnet, and Roberto Unger. It would be impossible to imagine critical legal theory as we know it today in all its renown
without the foundations provided by the elite law schools housing
these CLS progenitors. 25 For this reason, one cannot separate critical legal theory in the United States from the CLS movement.
For better or worse, they have become synonymous.
There are a number of law review articles,26 even law review
symposium issues 27 and an entire book,28 devoted to the subject of
critical legal theory. Central to critical legal theory is the denial of
the rational determinacy of legal reasoning. "Law," to the true
"crit," (i.e., someone who identifies himself or herself as a fellow
traveler in the Critical Legal Studies movement) "is simply politics
21. See generally Note, 'Round and 'Round the Brumble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1669, 1670-86 (1982) for a discussion of the historical development of Legal Realism.
22. Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 19, at 204.
23. Hutchinson and Monahan point out that many of the Realists participated
directly in various New Deal programs. Id.
24. See generally John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on CriticalLegal Studies, 36 Stan.
L. Rev. 391 (1984); Robert Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 28 (David Kairys ed. 1982).
25. Horowitz, Kennedy, and Unger teach at Harvard University Law School;
Heller at Stanford Law School; Trubek at the University of Wisconsin; and Tushnet
at Georgetown University Law Center. Resumes for many of the founding members of CLS are provided in Schlegel, supra note 24, at 391-403. A bibliography of

CLS works can be found in Bibliography of CriticalLegal Studies, 94 Yale L.J. 461
(1984) [hereinafter Bibliography].

26. See, e.g., Bibliography, supra note 25.
27. See, e.g., Reviews; CriticalLegal Studies, 47 Mod. L. Rev. 359 (1984) [herein-

after Reviews] and articles collected in the symposium issue of 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1
(1984).
28. See The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (David Kairys ed. 1982).
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dressed in different garb; it neither operates in a historical vacuum
nor does it exist independently of ideological struggles in society." 29 Put another way, what we regard as "legal doctrine" is actually a collection of dominant and dominating conceptions. These
conceptions, "reifications" as the crits are wont to call them, are
part of a larger discourse of power and knowledge serving to obscure the essential irrationality of our worldly existence.
Critical legal theorists' assault on formalistic legal reasoning
is grounded in their denial of any distinction between law and politics. "Liberal rights theory," the notion that individuals possess
"inherent" or fundamental rights, and, to a lesser-examined degree in crit legal literature, "entitlement theory," the legal intellectual foundation of the modern welfare state, particularly come
30
under strenuous attack by crits.
Rights rhetoric in particular is vilified in numerous CLS texts
as part of the reifying attempt in Western ideology to obscure unresolved contradictory values and dualities. These dualities-reason and desire; freedom and necessity; individualism and altruism;
autonomy and community; subjectivity and objectivity-pervade
our common law and statutory concepts of rights. 31 Law is seen by
the crits as an attempt to hide all the unresolved contradictions
and conflicts presented by these dualistic value structures. Importantly, the contradictions of liberal rights theory enable courts to
"move from one result to another without any consistent normative theory. Results are rationalized retrospectively."32 Liberalism's unresolved contradictions thus undermine the notion that
its regime of legal rights can ultimately transform "the oppressive
character of our social relations." In essence, CLS raises the possibility that the "rights" "won" under cases such as Brown v. Board
of Education 3 or Goldberg v. Kelly 34 are only chimeras, partial
29. Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 19, at 206. See also Reviews, supra note
27, at 359-61.
30. See, e.g., Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and
the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 36
Stan. L. Rev. 509 (1984). Examples of critical scholarship focusing on rights discourse abound. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictionsof Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 Yale L.J. 1063
(1981); Alan David Freeman, Anti-Discrimination Law: A CriticalReview, in The
Politics of Law, supra note 24, at 96; Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme
Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049 (1978); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights,

62 Texas L. Rev. 1363 (1984).
31. Sparer, supra note 30, at 516-17.
32. Id. at 517. The seminal crit treatment of "contradictions" is contained in
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1685 (1976).

33. 347 U.S. 483 (1957).
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makeshift concessions whose principal function is to preserve the
intellectual as well as social stability of the dominant order.
Critical legal theory's focus upon the indeterminacy of the
legal order derives primarily from European critical social theory.
This body of thought has concerned itself with questions of hierarchy, hegemony, contradiction, and false consciousness since its
proto-origins in the works of Marx and Nietzsche. 35 The trans-Atlantic filter for this type of "radical" thought was most likely the
political science and sociology courses taught on elite college and
university campuses in the 1960s. Most of the members of the
Critical Legal Studies movement doubtlessly and thoughtlessly
overexposed themselves to this socializing experience.
Critical legal theory's obsession with judge-made law as opposed to other forms of lawmaking, however, derives from its
Legal Realist legacy. The scholarly inquisition of peripheral legal
activity has long been a hallmark of legal academic mandarinism
in the United States. Legal Realism's focus on the judiciary, while
intended to pierce the veil of "transcendental nonsense, '36 only
34. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
35. See, e.g., Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Social Theory: Habermas
and the Frankfurt School (1981); and the works of Perry Anderson, supra note 19.
36. See generally Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809 (1935). Cohen's famous article criticized "contemporary legal thought"--Cohen wrote during the 1930s-for its propensity to rely on
the "absolute purity" of legal concepts inducing what he called "forgetfulness of
terrestrial human affairs." Id. at 809. Criticizing "the traditional language of argument and opinion," id. at 812, Cohen offered the following critique of deciding important human questions on the basis of concepts he regarded as "transcendental
nonsense":
Of course, it would be captious to criticize courts for delivering
their opinions in the language of transcendental nonsense. Logicians
sometimes talk as if the only function of language were to convey
ideas. But anthropologists know better and assure us that "language is
primarily a pre-rational function." Certain words and phrases are useful for the purpose of releasing pent-up emotions, or putting babies to
sleep, or inducing certain emotions and attitudes in a political or a judicial audience. The law is not a science but a practical activity, and
myths may impress the imagination and memory where more exact
discourse would leave minds cold.
Valuable as is the language of transcendental nonsense for many
practical legal purposes, it is entirely useless when we come to study,
describe, predict, and criticize legal phenomena. And although judges
and lawyers need not be legal scientists, it is of some practical importance that they should recognize that the traditional language of argument and opinion neither explains nor justifies court decisions. When
the vivid fictions and metaphors of traditional jurisprudence are
thought of as reasons for decisions, rather than poetical or mnemonic
devices for formulating decisions reached on other grounds, then the
author, as well as the reader, of the opinion or argument, is apt to forget the social forces which mold the law and the social ideals by which
the law is to be judged. Thus it is that the most intelligent judges in
America can deal with a concrete practical problem of procedural law

1987]

TAKING RIGHTS AGGRESSIVELY

continued a long tradition in U.S. legal scholarship: the vision
quest for some type of containing order in legal and social life
achieved through judicial lawmaking. CLS's use of this tattered
banner indicates the extent to which U.S. legal thought has obsessively concerned itself with questions essentially Freudian in
37
nature.
The scholarly practice of critical legal theorists is informed
by their focus on the indeterminant and contingent nature of the
legal and social order. The crit's program seeks "to shatter the
limiting conceptions of the possibilities of human association and
of social transformation embodied in liberal legal thought . . .to
complete the modern rebellion against the view that social arand corporate responsibility without any appreciation of the economic,
social, and ethical issues which it involves.
Id. at 812 (citations omitted). See also Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realist Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 431 (1930).
37. Human life in common is only made possible when a majority comes
together which is stronger than any separate individual and which remains united against all separate individuals. The power of this community is then set up as 'right' in opposition to the power of the
individual, which is condemned as 'brute force'. The replacement of
the power of the individual by the power of a community constitutes
the decisive step of civilization. The essence of it lies in the fact that
the members of the community restrict themselves in their possibilities of satisfaction, whereas the individual knew no such restrictions.
The first requisite of civilization, therefore, is that of justice-that is,
the assurance that a law once made will not be broken in favour of an
individual. This implies nothing as to the ethical value of such a law.
The further course of cultural development seems to tend towards
making the law no longer an expression of the will of a small community-a caste or a stratum of the population or a racial group-which,
in its turn, behaves like a violent individual towards other, and perhaps more numerous, collections of people. The final outcome should
be a rule of law to which all-except those who are not capable of entering a community-have contributed by a sacrifice of their instincts,
and which leaves no one-again with the same exception-at the
mercy of brute force.
The liberty of the individual is no gift of civilization. It was greatest before there was any civilization, though then, it is true, it had for
the most part no value, since the individual was scarcely in a position
to defend it. The development of civilization imposes restrictions on it,
and justice demands that no one shall escape those restrictions. ...
The urge for freedom, therefore, is directed against particular forms
and demands of civilization or against civilization altogether. It does
not seem as though any influence could induce a man to change his
nature into a termite's. No doubt he will always defend his claim to
individual liberty against the will of the group. A good part of the
struggles of mankind centers around the single task of finding an expedient accommodation--one, that is, that will bring happiness-between this claim of the individual and the cultural claims of the group
and one of the problems that touches the fate of humanity is whether
such an accommodation can be reached by means of some particular
form of civilization or whether this conflict is irreconcilable.
Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents 42-43 (1962).
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rangements are natural or inevitable." 38
At its most ethereal level, critical legal theory seeks to identify and overturn all contingent, hierarchizing forms of legal consciousness in order to free up "the indefinite possibilities of human
connection." 39 This liberating process is to be achieved through diverse means, such as rotating capital funds and the disaggregation
of consolidated property rights.40
At a more pedestrian level, critical legal theory degenerates
into irreverent half-seriousness and giddy late-night bullshit sessions in its attempts to cope with the awe-inspiring magnitude of
such millennialist goals. Erecting and fostering environments
(even in Wall Street law firms) of "unalienated relatedness," "intersubjective zap," and "small-scale microphenomenological evocation of real experiences in complex contextualized ways,"41 are
urged as the transformatory goals on the path to the final solution.
Given the loftiness of critical legal theory's goals, perhaps selecting a middle ground between these two paths of transcendence
and slapstick-where critique's pointed stiletto might cut through
the veil of utter nonsense legitimating most forms of domination
in our society-invites charges of intellectual lightweightedness.
For the most part, those in the Critical Legal Studies movement,
the principal expositors of critical legal theory in this country,
have trammeled over this middle ground in their sweeping negative critiques of "liberalism, rights and rights theory."42 Such
iconic bugaboos serve as blockades on the crits' freedom road to
Utopia.
For peoples of color, however, these icons mark trails along
sacred ground. The attack by the Critical Legal Studies movement
on rights and entitlement theory discourse can be seen as a
counter crusade to the hard campaigns and long marches of minority peoples in this country. Minority people committed themselves
to these struggles, not to attain some hegemonically functioning
reification leading to false consciousness, but a seat in the front of
the bus, repatriation of treaty-guaranteed sacred lands, or a union
card to carry into the grape vineyards.
The perils and promise of critical legal theory for peoples of
color lie buried deep within this apocryphal discourse of CLS on
the myth of rights. The relevance or irrelevance, the benefits or
38. Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 19, at 216.
39. Unger, supra note 18, at 579.
40. Id. at 596.
41. See Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 Stan. L. Rev.
1-5 (1984).
42. Sparer, supra note 30, at 512.
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dangers of this European-derived discursive practice for minority
legal scholars thus can only be discovered in the twilight zone of
this middle ground which has played such a central role in the battles of minority peoples. For beneath this ground lie buried our
own martyrs, combatants for a terrain that people of color are now
told may have been nothing more than the chimerical construct of
a mystified consciousness. Perhaps only parables can help minority people cope with the despair that arises from the ironic implications of such an argument. The white man's greatest liberatory
myth was perpetrated upon peoples of color solely to keep them in
chains.
The Perils
The frequent attacks by CLS on both rights and entitlement
discourse represent direct frontal assaults on the sole proven vehicle of the European-derived legal tradition capable of mobilizing
peoples of color as well as their allies in the majority society. Recalling the parable of the Grandfather and the Elevator, 43 CLS's
open assault on rights and entitlement theory represents the perils
of critical legal theory for peoples of color. CLS's attack reflects
Eurocentric readings of peoples of color's use of rights rhetoric. A
discursive practice of abandonment dismissing minority peoples as
irrelevant because of their anachronistic clinging to a false consciousness on rights can easily result from the acts of privileging
and delegitimation which ground such Eurocentred readings.
CLS's attacks on rights discourse demonstrate the perils of a
disengaged theoretical stance toward discourse unmediated by historical appreciation of the tradition from which a discursive practice is projected. The seizure of any form of discourse as an
insurrectionist instrument of propaganda by a class or social group
is determined in the final instance by its channelizing or constraining effects on the conduct of the opposed classes or social
groups being addressed. Rights discourse, precisely because of its
mystifying power in white America's legal and political mythology,
secured significant ideological high ground for the legal and political movements of minority groups in the post-World War II era.
CLS, with its overemphasis on theory's role in social movements,
has simply ignored the tactical considerations which come into
play in applying theory to practice. It is immaterial whether those
seeking insurrection against the dominant order believe the
"truth" of the seized-upon discursive practice. In fact, those com43. See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
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mitted to insurrection may well be motivated by the disparity between the "truth" of their own social and class situation, and the
"truth" expressed by the dominant order's discourse. The ultimate
insurrection, after all, is against the hypocrisy of those who prattle
about high ideals and by their conduct do nothing to actualize
those ideals in practice.
Granted, there may be intellectual merit in noting (a safe
generation's distance from the de jure abolition of Jim Crow laws
or abusive practices by welfare bureaucracies) that the moral high
ground captured by excessive reliance on white society's discourse
on rights may have been seized at the cost of "bolstering the idea
that fairness was not far away" 44 in the United States. But one
should not underestimate the ability of minority leaders to discount such costs in their strategic calculus of the gains to be made
in securing this moral high ground. Failure to recognize that the
dream had by a prophet such as Martin Luther King, Jr. was only
that, a dream, and not an illusion, is a form of false consciousness
engendered by a naive and unreflective historicism. Who, after all,
would blaspheme the sacrifices of those who were lynched, shot,
beaten, and jailed by speculating that in their hearts and minds
they conceived the freedom road as being but a few short steps
from completion. Were all the citadels of privilege maintained so
violently by the majority society for centuries simply to be surrendered at once to those who had been so recently invested by a
court or even a Congress with the mere banner of "rights"? The
embarrassing absurdity of positing such a naive belief "that fairness was not far away" in the minds of those involved in the struggles for minority "rights" serves to highlight the instrumental
function of rights rhetoric in the social movements of peoples of
color. "Indeed, effective propaganda must always try to influence
initially the judgment of the person addressed and to restrict
[one's] possibilities of judgment."45
Among the perils of CLS for peoples of color is its tendency
to abandon and marginalize reliance upon what it regards as a
false vision. But what nonmillennialist strategy capable of achieving at least partial mitigation of the immense denial of social, legal,
and economic justice in this country does Critical Legal Studies offer in place of the allegedly false consciousness it attacks? It is far
too easy for someone on a law professor's salary to offer openended reconstructive projects which may bring immense benefits
to a future generation. Minority law professors, however, who en44. Mark Tushnet, Book Review, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 694, 709 (1980).
45. Gadamer, supra note 1, at 11.
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joy the sinecurial comforts of an academic life, cannot afford the
luxury enjoyed by our CLS colleagues of not speaking to the real
and immediate needs of our respective peoples. The trust placed
in us demands the highest fiduciary standards.
Recall the reading which interprets the Grandfather's hesitancy in entering the Elevator as the primitive's misunderstanding
of the modern's science. 46 CLS offers a similar, seemingly easy
ride to new heights of understanding for peoples of color. All that
is required to reach the mountaintop is that we abandon what is
perceived as our mystified consciousness respecting the magic of
rights discourse. Many crits will even voice sympathy for our ignorance of "fancy theory," and offer to lead us to the new vistas
available on the top floors of legal academia. They may even work
for our appointments to their citadels of privilege.
But what of our people? Must they wait while we wallow in
the despair of negative critique? Negative critiques, standing
alone, lead us to abandon the only form of discourse which has effectively secured justice for our people during most of our lifetimes. And for what? Who knows, as half the fun of reaching the
millennia for comfortably ensconced tenured academic-types is the
long and enjoyable ride in getting there.
The reason why leftist and neo-leftist law professors feel little remorse or fear over the abandonment of rights discourse is
that for them "rights" represent a concept, rather than a phenomenon. It is easy to "trash" a concept. 47 One cannot experience the
pervasive, devastating reality of a "right," however, except in its
absence. One must first be denied that seat on the bus, one must
see the desecration of one's tribe's sacred lands, one must be without sanitary facilities in a farm field, to understand that a "right"
can be more than a concept. A right can also be a real, tangible
experience.
To relate this notion in terms which even the most inveterate
CLSer can understand, consider the pleasure which you, as a radical yet ironically well-paid law professor derive from seeing your
irreverent trashing of late nineteenth century consideration doctrine published in any one of what our profession regards as the
twenty or so "top ten law journals."48 (Charity prevents us from
46. See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
47. On "trashing," see generally Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 Stan. L. Rev.
293 (1984) (trashing means to take arguments seriously in their own terms, discover
they are foolish, and look for some order in the chaos exposed).
48. When I was at Rutgers Law School, Camden, in the early 1980s, untenured
faculty were told that the requirements for tenure were as objective as humanly
possible. All one had to do was publish three articles of 100 pages and 400 footnotes
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posing the obvious question: "What did you do today Johnny to advance the cause of the revolutionary vanguard of the
proletariat?"49)

Your "right" to speech (inscribed in your right to academic
"freedom") not only entitles you to be irrelevant in an irreverent
manner, but also to publish to the world by means of the obligatory asterisk at the bottom of page one of your article how well
enmeshed you are in the network of canonical figures who grant
nihil obstats to all CLS "pieces."50 One of course can argue that
I've either confused a right with a privilege, or the rewards garnered in a regime of meritocracy with those granted in a regime of
rights. But this ignores my point of concern about the anterior
functioning of rights in securing the tangible benefits attached to
privileged social and economic status in any of the egalitarian societies of late European liberalism.
Like many of the rights taken lightly by CLSers, the right to
speech is easy to denigrate when one has already reaped the returns of the enormous monetary investment in an education leading to a law professoriate. The right of "free" speech to express
oneself in a prestigious law review, scholarly journal, or op-ed page
of the New York Times was purchased at a cost far beyond the
in any of the "top ten law journals." When asked what the "top ten" law journals

were, senior colleagues would inevitably recite a list which included at least 20 law
reviews. The purpose of the "objective" requirement was to retain a degree of discretionary authority in assigning status ranking for law review articles which did
not appear in the Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Chicago, Michigan, New York University, and Columbia Law Reviews, but in other "marginally good" law reviews so regarded by the senior faculty. On Rutgers-Camden, affectionately known as the
"Beirut of American law schools" by its junior faculty, see Jay Feinman & Marc
Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 Geo. L.J. 875, 925-30 (1985).
At the beginning of its recent period of expansion, in the early
1970s, Rutgers was like many other aspiring, middle-tier law schools.
The path to prestige lay in faculty members publishing traditional,
doctrine-oriented articles in prestigious law reviews. The dominant institutional ethics were faculty autonomy in the classroom, traditional
intellectual standards in the production of scholarship, and conflict
avoidance in institutional affairs.
Ten years later the Rutgers faculty was divided into warring
camps that were commonly characterized as left and right, with few, if
any, faculty members constituting a liberal center. The appropriateness of nontraditional teaching and critical scholarship were important
issues for some, contemptible threats for others. Every issue of institutional policy was bitterly and closely contested.
Id. at 925.
49. Here I borrow from the English Marxist, Terry Eagleton: "[T]he question
irresistibly raised for the Marxist reader ... is simply this: How is a Marxist-structuralist analysis of a minor novel of Balzac to help shake the foundations of capitalism?" Quoted in Edward W. Said, Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies, and
Community, Critical Inquiry, Sept. 1982, at 15.

50. See Hunt, supra note 18, at 2.
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means of most peoples of color who are "educated" in ghetto, barrio, or reservation schools, or not at all (and after all, what's the
difference).
One can say that expressing one's opinion is not really the exercise of a "right," but in actuality the concretization in practice of
a reification representing nothing more than concessions to the
marketplace. To a person who cannot afford to enter the marketplace, however, entry barriers are felt, not thought. Thus, the
right to free travel will always remain a reified concept to anyone
who can "freely" walk up to a counter and purchase an airline,
train, or bus ticket, or better yet, hop in a BMW or well-maintained 1969 Volkswagen Beetle. For the person whose economic
mobility remains trapped in the ghetto, barrio, or reservation,
however, he or she feels no more free to break out of his or her
status-defined life situation than the most abject prisoner exiled to
a Soviet Gulag in Siberia.
My basic point is not that a "right" to free speech exists or
does not exist. I am not concerned with metaphysics, but with the
fact that politics is war carried on by other means, by discursive
practices of power and knowledge which define and sustain their
own truths.51 My concern is that we not surrender the few effective, albeit primitive, weapons in our possession to the enemy in
fighting their truths, while we wait faithfully for the Cap
Weinbergers of legal theory to deliver their promised new generation of tactical discursive weaponry sometime by the late 1990s.
It is not the fault of most of the members of the Critical
Legal Studies movement that they have never been the victims of
United States apartheid in their own lifetimes, that they have
never heard the stories of the Grandmothers and the Grandfathers
describing how bad things were before peoples of color started
winning their "rights." What else could a right be other than an
abstraction for someone who has never had their abstractions
taken away or denied.
In far too many perilous ways, CLS underestimates peoples
of color. To the underclass, the "concept" of rights has always possessed a highly instrumental character. Rights are something to
get so that one is treated similarly to those in the overclass. Ask
any ghetto, barrio, or reservation youth at a public defender intake
why you are asking him whether the police advised him of his Miranda "rights." Do you seriously believe that his answer will be
other than that you (the lawyer) are looking for a way to get him
"off," to beat the "system?" Is he likely to answer, given any set of
51. See generally Foucault, supra note 3, at 90.
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likely circumstances, that "Oh yea, you are concerned with vindicating my fundamental rights as a person under the Constitution
of the United States"?
For such an individual, rights, whether economic, political, or
legal, are seen as securing a tangible dignity in the most negative
of senses. That is, I am treated relatively no worse in the economic, political, or legal realm than that other guy, who happens
to differ from me only on the basis of racial or class characteristics.
The same shoddy and parasitic police practices that allow my
wealthy, cocaine-dealing white businessman brother to go free may
also get me off the hook for my far less quantitatively serious
crime against the social institution of property. But in that my
businessman brother's wealth affords him the opportunity to
purchase the legal skills necessary to realize such rights, while I
may well go to jail because my public defender simply lacks the
resources to wage an identical expensive defense, I thereby know I
am still denied my rights. There is much work, therefore, which
needs to be done with respect to these reifications which can land
me in jail.
From this perspective arising from the historical experience
of peoples of color in United States society "concepts" such as
"rights" or "justice" assume a life of their own in an experiential
sense. It is in this struggle for-the tangible benefits of these "concepts" that peoples of color mobilize themselves to forge their own
discourse. Unavoidably and irredeemably derivative in part of the
majority society's discursive practices, this discourse is an expression of a will to insurrection which continuously challenges the authority of the dominant order. Most importantly, this type of
discourse which finds its genesis in the historical struggles of peoples of color strategically employs those concepts, such as "rights,"
which speak most directly and forcefully to the prejudices of the
dominant culture. Thus, discovering contradiction in the majority
society's discourse on rights is the means, not the end, of the insurrectionist discursive practice of peoples of color: "In general, in a
deep conflict, the eyes of the downtrodden are more acute about
the reality of the present. For it is in their interest to perceive correctly in order to expose the hypocrisies of the rulers. They have
2
less interest in ideological deflection."5
Divorced from the essential historical situation of peoples of
color, and unwilling or unable to mediate its distance from this
rhetorical tradition in its reflective theoretical stance, CLS poses
52. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture
and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century 4 (1974).
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the peril of dangerous irrelevancy for minority people. Its irresponsible speculations on the benefits and dangers of rights discourse divert attention from the unexplored and promising
potential lying buried beneath the apocrypha of European-derived
discourse on rights. CLS fails to recognize that peoples of color
long ago recognized the spuriousness of a discourse which legitimated their oppression, but which itself contained unrevealed liberating myths which spoke with mystifying force and directness to
their oppressors.
The Promise
What promise then, does critical legal theory hold for peoples
of color? Particularly with respect to CLS, why should minority
law professors have an interest in an elite scholarly movement
comprised essentially of elite Anglo law professors nurtured in the
bowels of elite Anglo law schools. Most American Indian, Black,
and Latino people were highly critical of the white man's law long
before being exposed to The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries,53 or the works of famous dead Europeans. If not ourselves,
then certainly our parents and grandparents lived the contradictions of liberalism and liberal rights theory with a degree of intensity that few nonminority intellectuals can ever hope, or rather
not hope, to experience. While many of the minority students that
we teach today appear not to feel those contradictions as intensely
as our elders or perhaps even ourselves, nonetheless, the tangible
impact of the denial of rights to our various peoples still is felt
even by this generation born to relative, though by no means, complete privilege. In short, peoples of color, for the immediate present at least, do not require critical legal theory or CLS in order to
be critical of the United States legal system. We are all aware that
there is much work yet to be done.
Given the immense nature of our task in criticizing and
working to transform society, I do believe that critical legal theory
and yes, even CLS, can be of assistance in teaching us how to be
critical in a more effective, penetrating fashion. The decoding of
European-derived colonial and cultural imperialist discourse requires a methodology capable of unearthing what lies hidden away
beneath the apocryphal legal texts, fables, and myths which conceal the techniques and multiple forms of subjugation practiced
upon peoples of color in the United States. Critical legal theory
and CLS offer such a methodology.
53. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 Buffalo
L. Rev. 205 (1979).
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I feel it is important to recognize at the outset that today,
CLS is essentially a legal academic movement employing what are
finally becoming familiar academic tools in the law school: critical
social theory, deconstruction of texts or "trashing," critical histories, and other methods derived from the traditions of European
critical theory. These diverse tools have all been employed within
the CLS movement by critical legal scholars engaged in the practice of what David Trubek, a founder of CLS,54 has called "schol-

arship as politics."55 The tools employed in this practice of
scholarship as politics are all designed to chip away at the perceived "truths" of the white man's dominant legal world view to
reveal its underlying contradictions, historical contingencies, and
Eurocentric biases: enterprises in which minority law professors
share common concerns and aspirations.
A central tenet held by critical legal scholars is the belief
that by employing the tools of critical method to legal thought and
doctrine, they can transform legal consciousness, that is, the way
we think about and practice law.-% The idealized goal of CLS
scholarship as politics is this transformation of legal consciousness,
and through this transformation, to contribute to the larger goal of
social transformation.
It is important for minority legal scholars to always keep in
mind the point at which they must part ways with their CLS
brothers and sisters on the path of this transformative project.
CLS scholarship as politics would seek the transformation of legal
consciousness leading to the abandonment of various so-called reifications such as "rights." Minority legal scholars, because of the
unique positions of trust they hold from their people, must pursue
a different, nonmillennialist path. Our immediate goal must be to
transform the conditions oppressing our respective peoples. These
oppressive conditions demonstrate that the principles grounding
the dominant society's legal and political discourse are corrupted
54. See Schlegel, supra note 24, at 392-96.
55. David M. Trubek, Taking Rights Lightly?: Radical Voices in American
Legal Theory, Lecture on Law and Social Theory sponsored by the New School for

Social Research and the Cardozo Law School, Nov. 19, 1984 (on file with Law &
Inequality). See also Trubek, supra note 19, in which Trubek makes essentially the

identical claim: "If society is in some sense constituted by the world views that give
meaning to social interaction, then to change consciousness is to change society itself. This is the central tenet of the CLS creed, the grounding for its belief that
scholarship is politics." Id. at 592 (emphasis added). While Trubek would most
likely disagree with many of the points which I make in this article on the perils of
CLS for peoples of color, many of my own views on the promise of CLS for peoples
of color have been positively influenced through several talks with him, as well as
his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
56. See, e.g., Trubek, supra note 19, at 591-93.
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and remain unrealized. These conditions in fact are the tangible
proof of the failure of rights theory. Because many of these conditions are sustained by assumptions about the way the legal, political, and social world is, the concrete political program of minority
people relies on reifications such as "rights" to speak directly to
the conscience of the dominant society. Rights discourse enables
us to articulate the tangible injustices perpetrated upon peoples of
color by the existence of these conditions. Through rights discourse we challenge the assumptions which prevent the translation into practice of unrealized principles revered by the dominant
order, such as "rights."
Recall the divergent reading of the parable of the Grandfather and the Elevator. Like the Grandfather, we too find ourselves in a relative tactical position of weakness. We too must
sometimes dissemble in an alien discourse of power and knowledge. The treacherous and unfavorable terrain upon which we
wage our guerrilla war for our "rights" counsels a strategy
whereby we seek to be underestimated. Peoples of color must "go
under" and behind the lines of majority society's discursive practices to liberate our previously colonized and subjugated knowledges. These knowledges contain our expressions of a will to
insurrection which continuously challenges the authority of the
dominant order. This will, therefore, shall always press its challenge until it either expires, or the penetrative task of our critique
secures defensible positions from which to freely articulate our
own visions. For peoples of color, rights rhetoric is a primitive
weapon, but one we cannot afford to ignore or denigrate, though in
our hearts we may question its ultimate utility or relevance once
we secure our positions.
Thus, the minority scholar's task is that of the rhetorician,
understood in its classical sense and uncorrupted by the negative
reputation brought to the exercise of rhetorical skill by the Greek
Sophists.5 7 From Plato and Aristotle onward, the task of the rhetorician, properly understood, has been recognized to be the "mastery of the faculty of speaking in such an effectively persuasive
way that the arguments brought forward are always appropriate to
58
the specific receptivity of the souls to which they are directed."
Thus, we differ with our brothers and sisters in CLS in that
we cannot afford the luxury of a wholly negative critique which
distances and alienates an already historically proven hostile audience. We are all responsible for our discourse, its uses and abuses.
57. See Gadamer, supra note 1, at 21-24.
58. Id. at 22.
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Our scholarship as politics must be engaged at a practical, immediate level. We must be fancy rhetoricians who adopt neither a serious nor light theoretical stance towards rights. Rather, we must
adopt a warlike posture seeking to take rights aggressively. The
ideals and principles represented by rights must be deployed as
weapons, traps, and snares in the absence of some other containing
discursive practice which might constrain the majority from annihilating the minority. We have no choice but to take rights aggressively while we buy the time needed to perfect new weapons out of
the materials at hand provided by our insurrectionist discursive
traditions.
Thus we return to the parable of the Grandfather and the Elevator to explore the promise of critical legal theory for peoples of
color. The methodologies of critical legal theory provide numerous
tools to the minority scholar who desires to be an aggressive rhetorician engaged in discursive guerrilla warfare over the terrain of
rights. CLS methodologies are well tailored to the creative destruction of legal doctrines and forms of legal discourse which sustain the conditions oppressing minority peoples, and which stand
in the way of their realizing the tangible benefits promised under
rights discourse. (And here it should be pointed out that rights
discourse and legal discourse have always been regarded as capable
of divergence within the discursive traditions of peoples of color.)59
For example, one principal methodological tool frequently
employed by CLS scholars in their acts of creative destruction is
the critical legal history. 60 Critical legal histories can be used to
aid minority scholars in one of their most important scholarly
tasks-the decoding of the apocrypha of European-derived colonial
and cultural imperialist discourse.
Indian people have a long tradition of never pretending to
speak for others, so I will refer to my own scholarly concerns for
examples of the relevance of CLS to the legal scholarship of minority law professors. Much of my own scholarly work has been
devoted to the history of federal Indian law. Much of that history
revolves around the judicial articulation of legal rules and principles derived from the Doctrine of Discovery. The Discovery Doctrine was best articulated by Chief Justice John Marshall in a case
many law students probably encountered in their first year Property class, Johnson v. McIntosh.61 The Doctrine essentially stands
59. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
60. See generally Robert Gordon, CriticalLegal Histories, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57
(1984).
61. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 503 (1823).
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for the proposition that upon discovery by a European sovereign,
legal title to aboriginally held territory in the New World vested in
the discovering European nation. The indigenous tribes inhabiting
the territory henceforth were to be treated as dependent, diminished sovereigns whose rights and status were to be unilaterally
determined within the domestic law of the invading European co62
lonial government.
The Discovery Doctrine has been extended and interpreted
by United States courts to vest an unquestioned plenary power in
Congress acting in a guardian-ward relationship with respect to
American Indian Nations. 63 Principles and rules derived from the
Doctrine and its notions of congressional plenary power in Indian
affairs have legitimated numerous injustices and violations of
"rights": uncompensated congressional abrogations of Indian
treaty rights, takings of Indian lands and resources, forced sterilization of Indian women, violent suppression of traditional religions
and governing structures, and all the other usual forms of genocide
and ethnocide perpetrated upon Indian people by Anglo
"civilization." 64
In short, Indian people regard the Doctrine as the "separate
but equal"65 and Korematsu 66 of the white man's law respecting
their status and rights. Worse, however, is the fact that United
States courts continue to this day to rely on the Doctrine and its
derivative forms of legal discourse to determine Indian status and
67
rights.
My own work has focused upon the historical foundations of
the Doctrine and its Eurocentric, racist origins, to reveal its anachronistic and biased presuppositions. I have sought to demonstrate
the Doctrine's origins in European medieval and Renaissance legal
discourse respecting normatively divergent non-Christian peoples. 68 A by-product of the medieval Christian church and Europe's crusading era, this discourse treated all non-European alien
cultures as subject to Eurocentrically-conceived normative value
62. Id. at 504. See generally James Henderson, Unraveling the Riddle of Aboriginal Title, 5 Am. Indian L. Rev. 75 (1977).
63. See generally Robert Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The
Hard Trail of Decolonizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L.
Rev. 219 (1986).
64. Id. at 264-65.
65. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). But see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 438 (1954) (overruling Plessy's "separate but equal" doctrine).
66. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that the United
States could lawfully intern Japanese Americans in concentration camps during

World War II).
67. See Williams, supra note 63, at 265-91.
68. See generally Williams, supra note 6, at 1.
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structures, such as Christian natural law, or the Law of Nations.
Breach of divergence from these norms legitimated conquest by
European nations, who then assumed a duty of "civilization" and
conversion of these vanquished peoples which they "discovered."
Most importantly, "discovery" also vested in the European "discoverer" underlying title to the lands occupied by these peoples.69
In addition to this critical historiography of the Doctrine of
Discovery, I have also sought to demonstrate the manner in which
the biased and archaic structuring premises supporting the Doctrine infect all contemporary legal discourse regarding Indian
tribes. The Doctrine and its anachronistic premises sustain a contemporary legal and political regime threatening Indian people
with cultural liquidation. 70 This type of critical history is far different from the type of functionalist-evolutionary legal history
comprising the dominant tradition of United States legal historiography. 7 1 In broad outline form, the functionalist-evolutionary tradition advances the notion of a natural and proper progressive
social evolutionary path towards the type of liberal-individualistic
societies seen in the technocracies of the West, and that the natural and proper function of a legal system is to facilitate such an
72
evolution.
The functionalist-evolutionary tradition has infected the historiography of federal Indian law to a remarkable and dangerously
narcotizing degree. In this historiography, the Doctrine of Discovery has first been relativized as an aberration of an outdated colonial-imperialist mentality. After this exercise in apologetics, it is
usually demonstrated that through the purifying emetic of United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Doctrine and its derivative rules and principles have been adapted to changing needs. In
the process, its more oppressive and anachronistic aspects have
73
been allegedly humanized and liberalized.
A critical legal history of the Doctrine is engaged in a far
more radical practice of scholarly politics, a practice which recognizes at the outset the unmistakable political legitimating character of the functionalist-evolutionary tradition of legal historiography. Critical legal history challenges the basic premise that the
Doctrine and the legal discourse it has generated represent an ob69. Id.
70. See generally Williams, supra note 63, at 219.
71. For a descriptive analysis of functionalist-evolutionary legal history, see
Gordon, supra note 60, at 59-67.

72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Russel Barsh & James Henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes and
Political Liberty (1980) (provides an excellent overview of this historiography).
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jective response to objective historical processes. Rather, the Doctrine of Discovery and the body of rules and principles derived
from it in federal Indian law represent political products that, to
borrow the words of one crit historian, "arise from the struggle of
conflicting social groups that possess very disparate resources of
wealth, power, status, knowledge, access to armed force and orga''7
nizational capability. 4
A critical legal history of the Doctrine denies the Doctrine's
claim to legal and social rationality as a basis for determining Indian rights and status. The critical historical scholar's task is thus
to demonstrate instances where the Doctrine has cloaked bare
power in the fabric of a discourse of rights. A critical legal historiography of the Doctrine would effectively expose it as a product of
highly contingent historical and cultural circumstances that need
no longer constrain our thought on the possibilities of tribalism's
role in modern United States society. This deconstructive project
has as its ultimate goal, therefore, the transformation of federal
Indian law towards a basis which adequately secures and protects
in a tangible, real sense tribal status and rights. Such a transformation would protect tribal sovereignty, respect treaties, and guarantee and provide just compensation for all past breaches. This
transformative goal can never be achieved, however, until the
present conceptual basis of federal Indian law, the Doctrine of Discovery, is destroyed.
I am certain that other non-Anglo legal scholars desire to
pursue similar transformative projects of benefit to their peoples
whom they serve. The contemplated benefits from such projects
transcend racial or ethnic boundaries, uniting us in a common
struggle against a dominant vision of law which we all experience
as alien and alienating with respect to our visions of self and community. We are all maroons; our peoples-Black, Brown, Redrelegated to the Dismal Swamps on the periphery of late capitalism. 75 We share our fugitive existence in the unreclaimable waste-

74. Gordon, supra note 60, at 101.
75. Virtually ignored by the dominant historiographical tradition, "maroon"
communities of fugitive slaves, dispossessed American Indians, runaway indentured
servants, white debtors, and escapees from Spanish galleons resisted and frequently
terrorized European colonizers in the Carribean and North, South, and Central
America. The histories of countries such as Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, and Haiti
were substantially shaped by the resistance of these independent militant maroon
societies.
In the United States, the most famous haven for maroon communities was the
Great Dismal Swamp. This vast unreclaimed marsh region extended north and
south a few miles inland from the Atlantic on both sides of the Virginia-North Carolina border, covering an area roughly the size of Rhode Island.
The maroon communities of the Dismal Swamp were originally formed by
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lands abandoned to wild nature by the core society. Unable to
participate fully in the freedoms, the "rights," enjoyed at the core,
we are recognized as the detritus of a decaying vision; a vision
which sought our dispossession, our bondage, or our peonage.
As minority individuals placed in unique positions of status
and privilege, and paradoxically, on the margins of this Anglodominated society (even in our own law schools, we are maroons),
I should think we are uniquely qualified to practice a form of politics requiring an insider's knowledge applied from an outsider's
perspective. In fact, I think that as people of color, we are far
more qualified to engage in a critique of the white man's legal vision than many of the Anglos from elite law schools who presently
dominate CLS with what I regard as a dangerously irrelevant form
of legal mandarinism. That does not mean we should not welcome
CLSers as our allies in struggle. But the time has come to be
blunt. If CLS is to maintain its relevancy for peoples of color,
then, as a minimal qualification, its practitioners must be able to
write in comprehensible prose English and deal with important
and complex issues in a serious and purposive mature fashion.
Like my liberal and radical nonminority colleagues, I strongly support Affirmative Action, but I am also concerned about standards
for participation in the movements of our respective peoples.
remnants of the Algonquian, Chesapeake, and Tuscarora tribal groups which had
been exterminated and enslaved by the English in the early and mid-seventeenth
century. Fugitive slaves, persecuted Irish Catholics, and other refugees from colonial British society subsequently followed into the safety of the virtually impenetrable swamp, and were freely accepted into the Indian maroons. F. Roy Johnson,
Tales from Old Carolina 153-60 (1965).
Beginning in the early eighteenth century, the maroons continually terrorized
Virginia and North Carolina plantation slaveholders. Maroon bands conducted frequent and bloody guerrilla raids, liberating slaves, and plundering crops and livestock. In 1714, then-Governor Spotswood of Virginia warned the colonists: "Loose
and disorderly people daily flock to this no-man's land." Johnson, supra, at 41.
There is evidence of a well-articulated and vigorous insurrectionist discourse,
and a complex and relatively comprehensive communications network which disseminated this discourse throughout the maroon communities in the Swamp. I
would suggest that there is much work which still needs to be done in unearthing
the discursive practices of this neglected region of the history of peoples of color.
My own knowledge of the history of the maroons and of the Great Dismal Swamp
was substantially enhanced by William M. Calhoun, Jr., a Black student at the University of Wisconsin Law School who has written a paper entitled The Rebirth of
Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness: Swamp Resistance to Slavery and the
Fullfillment of the Ideas of the Revolution (on file with Law & Inequality). More
accessible materials include Herbert Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts
(1963); Hubert J. Davis, The Great Dismal Swamp (1962); F. Roy Johnson, Tales
from Old Carolina (1965); Richard Price, Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas (1973); R.H. Taylor, Slave Conspiraciesin North Carolina,5 N.
Car. Hist. Rev. 20 (1928).

